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Remaining  errors  are  mine. Abstract 
This  paper  investigates  the  commonly  held  belief  that  government 
spending  is normally  financed  through  a combination  of  taxes  and 
bond  sales.  The  argument  is a technical  one  and  requires  a detailed 
analysis  of  reserve  accounting  at  the  central  bank.  After  carefully 
considering  the  complexities  of reserve  accounting,  it is argued  that 
the  proceeds  from  taxation  and  bond  sales  are technically  incapable 
of  financing  government  spending  and  that  modern  governments 
actually  finance  all  of  their  spending  through  the  direct  creation  of 
high-powered  money.  The analysis  carries significant  implications  for 
fiscal  as well  as monetary  policy. 1.  INTRODUCTION 
The  optimal  method  by which  to  finance  government  (deficit)  spending  remains  a controversial 
topic  among  many  economists  (see  Modigliani,  1992;  Trostel,  1993;  Ludvigson,  1996;  and  Smith 
et al.,  1998).  Although  most  would  agree  that  government  financial  policies  require  choosing 
among  the  imposition  of taxes,  the  sale  of interest-bearing  debt  obligations  and  the 
‘printing’/creation  of government  money’  (or  some  combination  of these),  there  is often  strong 
disagreement  regarding  the  macroeconomic  consequences  of these  choices.  The  Barro-Ricardo 
thesis  (Barro,  1974)  for  example,  suggests  that  the  financing  choice  is inconsequential.  This,  it is 
argued,  is because  the  knowledge  that  bond-financed  government  spending  will require  higher 
taxes  in the  future  induces  households  to  save  more  now.  The  induced  saving,  which  is just 
sufftcient  to  purchase  the  new  government  debt,  leaves  private  net  wealth  unchanged,  thereby 
completely  neutralizing  the  stimulative  effect  of government  spending.  Similarly,  as Tobin 
recognizes,  spending  financed  by issuing  demand  obligations  (i.e.  ‘printing’  money)  might  lead 
monetarist  Ricardian  to  suggest  that  a “money  rain”,  like  a “bond  rain”,  will have  no  effect  on 
a 
aggregate  private  wealth  or  consumption  since  adjustments  in the  price  level  will prevent  the  real 
quantity  of money  from  changing  (1998).  Thus,  bond-  or  money-financed  deficit  spending  yields 
results  ‘equivalent’  with  those  that  would  have  resulted  if all spending  had  been  financed  by 
contemporaneous  taxation. 
In contrast,  some  Keynesians  maintain  that  choices  concerning  the  source(s)  of deficit 
finance  are  indeed  relevant  (Blinder  and  Solow,  1973,  1976;  Buiter,  1977;  Lerner,  1973;  Tobin 
’  Government  money  will be used  to  refer  to  high-powered  money  (HPM),  defined  as member 
bank  deposit  balances  at the  Federal  Reserve  plus  total  currency  outstanding.  When  necessary, 
changes  in the  ‘money  supply’  (Ml,  M2,  etc.)  will be  distinguished  from  changes  in HPM. 
-l- 1961).  For  them,  the  economic  consequences  of borrowing  and  ‘printing’  money  can  differ 
substantially  from  those  obtained  when  government  spending  is financed  solely  by 
contemporaneous  taxation.  Among  members  of this  group,  most  would  probably  agree  that 
‘printing’  money  is both  the  least  common  and  the  least  desirable  method  for  financing  the 
government’s  spending.  Indeed,  most  would  probably  say that  bond  sales  are (and  should  be) 
used  to  finance  the  excess  of  spending  over  taxation. 
Despite  differing  beliefs  regarding  the  consequences of the  financing  decision,  both  groups 
clearly  believe  that  the  government  does  choose  how to  finance  its  spending.  What  is 
conspicuously  absent  in these  ongoing  debates,  however,  is a detailed  examination  of the  nuances 
of reserve  accounting.  Because  these  nuances  have  not  been  incorporated  into  standard  analyses, 
many  economists  continue  to  debate  the  macroeconomic  consequences  of alternative  “financing” 
methods.  These  debates  follow  directly  from  the  apparent  interdependence  among  taxes,  bond 
sales,  and  deficit  spending.  By  considering  the  impact  of these  operations  on bank  reserves,  their 
interdependence  can  be explained  as a consequence  of their  “reserve  effects”,  rather  than  as 
necessary  financing  relationships. 
Thus,  this  paper  closely  examines  the  “reserve  effects”  of the  Treasury’s  operations  by 
tracing  through  the  impact  of government  spending,  taxing  and  bond  sales  on  aggregate  member 
bank  reserves.  Section  2 details  the  impact  of government  spending  and  taxing  on  bank  reserves 
as well  as the  significance  of the  resulting  reserve  effects.  In  Section  3, some  important  strategies 
for  minimizing  the  reserve  effects  are  introduced.  The  case  of deficit  spending  is taken  up  in 
Section  4, where  the  reserve  effects  of various  methods  for  the  sale of government  debt  are 
examined.  In  Section  5, the  complexities  of reserve  accounting  are  caremlly  considered,  and 
-2- newly-created  money  is revealed  as the  source  of all government  finance.  It is further  argued  that 
the  proceeds  from  taxation  and  bond  sales  are  not  even  capable  of financing  government  spending 
since  their  collection  implies  their  destruction.  In the  concluding  section,  it is suggested  that 
debates  concerning  alternative  methods  for  financing  the  government’s  (deficit)  spending  should, 
instead,  be  debates  about  alternative  means  of draining  (excess)  reserves  from  the  banking  system. 
2.  THE  “RESERVE  EFFECTS”  OF  TAXING  AND  SPENDING 
Before  examining  the  “reserve  effects”  of various  Treasury  operations,  it is, perhaps,  prudent  to 
begin  by looking  closely  at aggregate  member  bank  reserves*.  Beginning  with  the  Federal 
Reserve’s  balance  sheet,  equivalent  terms  can be  added  to  each  side,  and  the  entries  can be 
manipulated  algebraically  in order  to  isolate  member  bank  reserves3.  The  result,  often  referred  to 
as the  ‘reserve  equation’,  depicts  total  member  bank  reserves  as the  difference  between  alternative 
‘sources’  and  ‘uses’  of reserve  funds.  The  reserve  equation  can  be written  as: 
2  Although  reserve  requirements  are generally  met  by holding  a combination  of vault  cash  and 
checking  accounts  at district  Federal  Reserve  banks,  accounts  held  by depository  institutions  at 
Federal  Home  Loan  Banks,  the  National  Credit  Union  Administration  Central  Liquidity  Facility, 
or  correspondent  banks  may  also  count  toward  satisfying  the  reserve  requirement.  Depository 
institutions  do  not  have  to  meet  these  reserve  requirements  on  a daily  basis.  They  have  a two- 
week  “reserve  period”  (ending  on  Wednesdays)  within  which  they  must  maintain  average  daily 
total  reserves  equal  to  the  required  percentage  of average  daily transactions  accounts  held  during 
the  two-week  period  ending  the preceding  Monday.  Thus,  despite  being  referred  to  as a 
contemporaneous  reserve  accounting  (CRA)  system,  it is, in practice,  lagged  for  two  days.  That 
is, banks  always  have  two  days  (Tuesday  and  Wednesday)  within  which  to  acquire  (expost) 
reserves  needed  to  eliminate  a known  deficiency.  While  some  banks  may  choose  to  hold  excess 
reserves,  profit-maximizing  banks  will  economize  on  reserves.  Unless  a bank  has  a preference  for 
idle  funds,  it will  exchange  excess  reserves  for  “earning  assets”  such  as loans  or  securities. 
3  See  (Ranlett,  1977,  pp.  19 l- 193) for  the  derivation. 
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From  Figure  1, it is clear  that  an increase  in any  of the  bracketed  terms  on  the  left will increase 
reserves  while  an increase  in any  of the  bracketed  terms  on  the  right  will reduce  them. 
2. I  “‘Reserve Effects  ” of  Taxing  and  Spending 
In this  section,  the  reserve  effects  of two  important  Treasury  operations,  government  spending 
and  taxing,  will be  analyzed.  To  emphasize  the  impact  of these  operations  on bank  reserves,  the 
case  in which  aJ  government  payments  and  receipts  are  immediately  credited/debited  to  accounts 
held  at Reserve  Banks  will be considered4. 
When  the  government  spends,  it writes  a check  on  its account  at the  Federal  Reserve. 
Assuming  the  check  is deposited  into  an account  at a commercial  bank,  member  bank  reserves  rise 
(by the  amount  of the  check)  as the  Federal  Reserve  debits  the  Treasury’s  account,  decreasing  the 
right-hand  bracket  (RHB)  in Figure  1, and  credits  the  account  of a commercial  bank.  Thus,  a 
system-wide  increase  in member  bank  reserves  results  whenever  a check  drawn  on  a Treasury 
’  It is, of course,  true  that  the  Treasury  keeps  accounts  at thousands  of commercial  banks  and 
other  depository  institutions  as well  as Federal  Reserve  banks.  This  changes  things  considerably 
and  will be taken  up  in the  next  section. 
-4- account  at a Federal  Reserve  bank  is deposited  with  a commercial  bank.  Government  spending, 
then,  increases  aggregate  bank  reserves  (ce~is  yaribus). 
When,  instead  of &awirzg  on  its account  at the  Fed,  the  Treasury  receives funds  into  this 
account,  the  reverse  is true.  For  example,  if a taxpayer  pays  his taxes  by  sending  a check  to  the 
IRS,  his bank  and  the  banking  system  as a whole,  lose  an equivalent  amount  of reserves,  as the 
IRS  deposits  the  check  into  the  Treasury’s  account  at the  Federal  Reserve.  Total  member  bank 
reserves  decline  as the  RIB  in Figure  1 increases,  Thus,  the  payment  of taxes  by check  results  in 
a system-wide  decrease  in member  bank  reserves  (ceterisparibus)5. 
If Treasury  spending  out  of its accounts  at Federal  Reserve  banks  were  perfectly 
coordinated  with  tax  receipts  deposited  directly  into  the  Treasury’s  accounts  at Reserve  banks, 
their  opposing  effects  on  reserves  would  offset  one  another.  That  is, if the  government  ran  a 
balanced  budget  with  daily  tax  receipts  and  government  spending  timed  to  offset  one  another, 
there  would  be no  &  effect  on  bank  reserves.  However,  as Figure  2 shows,  the  Treasury’s  daily 
receipts  and  disbursements  from  accounts  at Reserve  banks  are  highly  incommensurate.  Indeed, 
they  can  differ  by almost  $6 billion. 
’ It is worth  noting  that  government  spending  must  originally  have  preceded  taxation.  That  is, the 
payment  of taxes  could  not  increase  the  Treasury’s  account  at the  Fed  (RI-B  term),  reducing  bank 
reserves,  until  the  reserves  had  been  created.  Moreover,  the  Federal  Reserve  and/or  Treasury,  as 
the  only  agents  capable  of  supplying  them,  must  have  been  the  original  source  of these  reserves. 
This  will  be taken  up  in Section  5. 
-5- Figure  2 
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Source:  Daily  Treasury  Statement,  http://fedbbs.access,gpo.gov/dailys.htm 
Thus,  despite  an  attenuation  of the  “reserve  effect”  due  to  the  simultaneous  injection  and 
withdrawal  of reserves,  government  spending  and  taxation  will  never  perfectly  offset  one  another, 
Even  if a more  even  pattern  could  be established,  some  discrepancies  would  persist  because,  as 
Irving  Auerbach  recognized,  “‘there is no  way  to  determine  in advance,  with  complete  accuracy, 
the  total  amount  of the  receipts  or the  speed  at which  the  revenue  collectors  will be able to 
process  the  returns”  (1963,  p.  349).  Thus,  while  concurrent  government  spending  and  taxation 
have  sume  offsetting  impact  on  reserves,  the  reserve  effect  from  the  Treasury’s  daily  cash 
operations  would  still be  substantial,  especially  “if they  were  channeled  immediately  through  the 
Treasurer’s  balance  at the  Reserve  Banks”  (Auerbach,  1963,  p.  333). 
2.2  The Importance  of  the  “Reserve  Effect  ” 
The  inability  to  perfectly  coordinate  Treasury  receipts  and  expenditures  has  serious  implications 
for  the  level  of  bank  reserves  and,  subsequently,  the  money  market.  Because  banks  are  required 
by law  to  hold  reserves  against  some  fraction  of their  deposits  but  earn  no  interest  on  reserves 
held  in excess  of this  amount,  they  will normally  prefer  not  to  hold  substantial  excess  reserves. 
-6- Government  spending,  then,  will leave  them  with  more  reserves  than  they  prefer/need  to  hold 
while  the  clearing  of tax  payments  will  leave  them  with  fewer  reserves  than  are  desired/required 
(ceterisparibus). 
The  fed  fi_mds market  is the  “market  of first  resort”  for  banks  wishing  to  rid themselves  of 
excess  reserves  or to  acquire  reserves  needed  to  meet  deficiencies  (Poole,  1987,  p.  10).  When 
there  is a build-up  of reserves  within  the  system,  many  banks  will attempt  to  lend  reserves  in the 
federal  Cmds  market.  The  problem,  of course,  is that  lending  reserves  in the  funds  market  cannot 
help  a banking  system,  which  began  with  an  ‘equilibrium’  level  of reserves,  to  rid itself  of excess 
reserves.  Moreover,  when  the  system  is f-lush with  excess  reserves,  banks  will find  that  there  are 
no bidders  for  these  funds,  and  the  federal  funds  rate  may  fall to  a zero  percent  bid. 
Likewise,  the  clearing  of tax  payments  will leave  a banking  system  which  began  with  an 
‘equilibrium’  level  of reserves  short  of required  (and/or  desired)  reserves.  Banks  will  look  to  the 
funds  market  to  acquire  needed  reserves,  but  since  all  banks  cannot  return  to  an equilibrium 
reserve  position  by borrowing  federal  funds,  a system-wide  shortage  will  persist.  That  is, like  a 
system-wide  surplus,  a system-wide  deficiency  cannot  be  alleviated  through  the  fi_mds market6; 
attempts  to  do  so will  simply  drive  the  &nds  rate  higher  and  higher. 
Importantly,  the  fi_mds rate  is not  the  only  interest  rate  affected  by changes  in the  level  of 
’ When  there  is a reserve  deficiency  for  the  banking  system  as a whole,  banks  could  attempt  to 
resolve  the  deficiency  by reducing  deposits.  If a single  bank  begins  this  process  (selling  U.S. 
securities  to  a member  of the  non-bank  public  or  allowing  loans  to  be repaid  without  reissuing 
them),  it will result  in a multiple  contraction  of deposits  (assuming  all banks  follow  suit).  Though 
this  would  ultimately  eliminate  the  banking  system’s  reserve  deficiency  (without  requiring  banks 
to  acquire  additional  reserves),  the  process  takes  time  and  will disrupt  interest  rates  until 
‘equilibrium’  is restored.  Deficiencies  will,  therefore,  usually  be eliminated  as the  banking  system 
acquires  more  reserves,  not  as it reduces  deposits  that  reserves  are required  to  ‘back  up’. 
-7- bank  reserves  As the  “focus  of monetary  policy”,  the  funds  rate  is the  “anchor  for  all other 
interest  rates”  (Poole,  1987,  p.  11).  Thus,  when  banks  are  content  with  their  reserve  positions, 
Treasury  operations  (such  as government  spending  and  taxation)  disrupt  these  positions  by adding 
or  draining  reserves,  and  banks  react  to  these  changes  by first  turning  to  the  funds  market.  There, 
the  funds  rate  is bid up  or  down  and  other  short-term  interest  rates  are  affected.  Although  some 
individual  banks  will be successful  in eliminating  their  own  reserve  deficiencies/excesses,  the 
banking  system  us a  whole  will not  be able to  alleviate  a shortage/deficiency  on  its own.  Only 
through  government  adding/draining  of reserves  can  a system-wide  imbalance  be  eliminated. 
Because  attempts  to  resolve  system-wide  reserve  ‘disequilibrium’  through  the  funds  market  can 
affect  a number  of  other  interest  rates,  a variety  of procedures  have  been  developed  to  mitigate 
the  adverse  impact  of  Treasury  operations  on  banks’  reserve  positions. 
3.  STRATEGIES  FOR  REDUCING  THE  “RESERVE  EFFECT” 
In the  preceding  discussion,  the  effects  of government  spending  and  taxing  on  bank  reserves  were 
examined  by assuming  that  all disbursements  and  receipts  were  immediately  credited/debited  to 
the  Treasury’s  accounts  at Federal  Reserve  banks.  This  treatment  allowed  us  to  highlight  the 
impact  of each  of these  operations  on  the  level  of bank  reserves,  but  it did  not  paint  a realistic 
picture  of the  way  things  currently  work.  If things  did  indeed  work  this  way,  there  would  be  an 
unrelenting  disruption  of banks’  reserve  positions  and,  subsequently,  chronic  turmoil  in the  funds 
market.  Because  these  consequences  are highly  undesirable  from  a policy  perspective,  some 
important  strategies  have  been  developed  to  mitigate  these  persistent,  yet  unpredictable,  “reserve 
effects”.  Let  us  move  to  an examination  of these  techniques, 
-8- 3. I  The  Use of  Tmc and  Loan  Accounts 
The  disruptive  nature  of the  Treasury’s  operations  was  recognized  under  the  Independent 
Treasury  System’  and  ultimately  led to  the  use  of General  and  Special  Depositories8,  private 
banks  in which  government  funds  could  be kept.  This  was  the  first  important  strategy  developed 
to  mitigate  the  “reserve  effect”.  As Ranlett  recognized,  the  reserve  effect  caused  by the  “point 
inflow-continuous  outflow  nature  of Treasury  activities”  could  be tempered  by placing  certain 
government  receipts  into  Tax  and  Loan  (T&L)  accounts  at private  depositories  (1977,  p.  226). 
Thus,  the  reserve  drain  that  would  otherwise  accompany  payments  made  to  the  government  could 
be  temporarily  preventedg.  The  benefits  of using  these  depositories  were  quickly  recognized,  and 
their  functions  were  broadened  whenever  it became  clear  that  they  could  be used  to  further 
mitigate  the  reserve  effect.  As the  size of the  government’s  fiscal  operations  grew,  Special 
Depositories  quickly  became  the  most  important  group  of bank  depositories  As Figure  3 shows, 
just  over  two-thirds  of all Federal  tax  receipts  are currently  deposited  directly  into  T&L  accounts. 
’ The  Independent  Treasury  System  was  in effect  long  before  the  establishment  of the  Federal 
Reserve  System.  It was  established  in  1840,  abolished  the  following  year,  re-established  in  1846, 
and  discontinued  in  192 1. 
’  General  Depositories  have  become  known  as “remittance-option  banks”  while  Special 
Depositories  are currently  referred  to  as “note-option  banks”.  Both  are depository  institutions 
with  T&L  Accounts,  but  a “remittance-option  bank”,  like its predecessor,  the  General  Depository, 
must  remit  its T&L  balances  to  a Reserve  bank  the  day  after  the  f%nds are received.  In  1978, 
“note-option  banks”  were  given  the  opportunity  to  accumulate  the  daily  tax  payments  they  receive 
by transferring  them  from  the  ordinary  T&L  Accounts  (where  they  are held  interest-free  for  one 
day)  into  an interest-bearing  “note  account”.  Up  to  a pre-approved  limit,  these  funds  can  remain 
in “note  accounts”  until  the  Treasury  “calls”  for  them  to  be transferred  to  Reserve  Banks 
(Manypenny  and  Bermudez,  1992,  p,  728). 
’ In this  case,  a distinction  between  the  ‘supply  of money’  and  HPM  should  be made.  When  tax 
receipts  are placed  into  a T&L  account,  HPM  (bank  reserves  and  currency  outstanding)  is not 
affected.  The  ‘money  supply’  (Ml),  however,  is.  When  funds  are transferred  from  demand 
deposits,  where  they  are part  of Ml,  into  T&L  accounts  (or  the  Treasury’s  account  at the  Fed), 
which  is not  part  of any  standard  measure  of the  money  supply  (Ml,  M2,  etc.),  the  ‘money 
supply’  declines. Figure  3 
Disposition  of  Federal  Tax  Deposits  (Nov.  ‘97-  Mar.  ‘98) 
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Source:  Daily  Treasury  Statement,  http://fedbbs.access.gpo.gov/dailys.htm 
Today,  the  T&L  accounts  are by far the  most  important  device  used  to  guard  the  money  market 
against  the  sizable  daily  differences  (shown  in Figure  2) between  the  flows  of government  receipts 
and  disbursements. 
3.2 Managing  the  Treasury  ‘s Balance  at  the Fed 
Since  almost  all government  spending  involves  writing  checks  on  accounts  at the  Fed,  virtually 
funds  in T&L  accounts  must  eventually  be transferred  to  Reserve  banks”.  Because  only  net 
changes  in the  Treasury’s  account  at the  Fed  impact  the  aggregate  level  of reserves  (ceteris 
all 
paribzq),  maintaining  “the  Treasurer’s  balance  with  the  Reserve  Banks  at a reasonably  constant 
level”  is the  second  strategy  used  to  minimize  the  “reserve  effect”  of the  Treasury’s  operations 
(ibid.,  p.  364).  Specifically,  the  Treasury  “aims  to  maintain  a closing  balance  of  $5 billion  in its 
Federal  Reserve  checking  accounts  each  day”  (Manypenny,  et.  al,  1992,  p.  728).  Figure  4 shows 
how  successful  the  Treasury  is in its endeavor  to  maintain  its target  closing  balance. 
lo This  is not  because  the  government  needs  the  proceeds  from  taxation  in order  to  spend  again, 
but  because  it chooses  to  coordinate  its taxing  and  spending.  This  will be taken  up  in the  final 
section. 
-lO- Figure  4 
Daily Closing  Balance  In Treasury’s  Account  at the 
Federal  Reserve (Nov. ‘97 - Mar. ‘98) 
Source:  Daily  Treasury  Statement,  http://fedbbs.access.gpo.gov/dailys.htm 
Recall  that  the  government  receives  funds  into  its accounts  at the  twelve  Reserve  banks  as well  as 
thousands  of commercial  banks  each  day but  that  nearly  all government  spending  is done  by 
writing  checks  on  accounts  at Reserve  banks.  Maintaining  a closing  balance  of  $5 billion  at 
Reserve  banks,  then,  usually requires  transferring  the  appropriate  amount  from  T&L  accounts  to 
the  Treasury’s  account  at the  Fed.  For  example,  if the  Treasury  expected  to  receive  $5 billion 
directly  into  accounts  at Reserve  banks  (today)  and  expected  $6 billion  in previously-issued 
checks  to  be presented  for  payment  (today),  $1 billion  wiii need  to  be transferred  to  the 
Treasury’s  account  at the  Fed  (today)  so that  there  will be no  net change  in the  level  of reserves. 
The  Treasury  transfers  funds  to  cover  anticipated shortfalls  by making  a “call”  on  T&L 
accounts.  In most  cases,  advance  notice  is given  before  transferring  funds  from  these  accounts”. 
rr  Special  Depositories  (or  note-option  banks)  fall into  three  categories:  A banks,  B banks  and  C 
banks.  A and  B banks  are typically  smaller  institutions,  while  depositories  that  are  classified  as C 
banks  are generally  large  banks.  T&L  calls  are  calculated  as fractions  of the  book  balance  in each 
T&L  account  on  the  previous  day.  “Calls”  made  on  A and  B banks  are usually  made  with  longer 
lead  times  than  calls made  on  C banks,  and  the  latter  are usually  the  only  banks  against  which 
same-day  or  next  day  calls may  be issued. 
-ll- A “reverse-call”  or  “direct  investment”  is also  possible.  This  would  be necessary  if the  Treasury’s 
closing  balance  at Reserve  banks  was  expected  to  substantially  exceed  $5 billion12.  To  avoid  the 
reserve  drain  that  would  result  from  an excessive  closing  balance,  the  Treasury  may  place  some  or 
all of the  excessive  funds  into  T&L  accounts  at note-option  banks13.  Whether  “calling”  funds 
,fiom  T&L’s  to  make  up  for  an expected  shortfall  or transferring  funds  to T&L’s  through  direct 
investment  (or  canceling  previous  calls)  to  prevent  an excessive  closing  balance,  the  amounts 
transferred  are  intended  to  maintain  the  Treasury’s  balance  at Reserve  banks  as steady  as possible. 
In pursuit  of this  goal,  the  Treasury  relies  on  the  cooperation  of the  Federal  Reserve. 
3.3  Coordination  With  The Federal  Reserve 
The  Federal  Reserve  is extremely  interested  in helping  the  Treasury  achieve  its target  closing 
balance  because  the  Treasury’s  balance  at the  Fed  is “often  the  biggest  source  of uncertainty 
about  reserve  levels”  (Meulendyke,  1989,  p.  159).  Indeed,  the  Fed’s  ability  to  successfully 
conduct  monetary  policy  (specifically,  to  hit its target  h_mds rate)  depends,  to  a large  extent,  on 
the  Treasury’s  ability  to  hit its target  closing  balance.  Daily  contact  between  the  Treasury  and  the 
l2 The  closing  balance  in the  Treasury’s  account  at the  Fed  could  exceed  the  target  level  for  two 
reasons.  First,  previously  placed  T&L  calls  may  have  been  too  large.  In this  case,  the  amount  of 
spending  from  accounts  at Reserve  banks  is less than  the  sum  of the  payments  received  directly 
into  accounts  at the  Fed  and  the  amounts  “called”  from  T&L’s  Second,  it is possible  that  the 
payments  made  to  the  government  and  deposited  directly  into  accounts  at Reserve  banks  exceed 
the  amount  presented  for  payment  from  these  accounts.  This  could  happen,  for  example,  during 
months  in which  quarterly  tax  payments  sent  directly  to  accounts  at the  Fed  are large  enough  to 
more  than  compensate  for  government  spending. 
I3 The  Treasury  will not,  in all instances,  be  successful  in its attempt  to  directly  invest  its excess 
Curds.  Some  note-option  banks  will  not  meet  the  collateral  requirements  and  will be ineligible 
recipients  of additional  T&L  funds.  Additionally,  T&L  accounts,  like the  Treasury’s  account  at 
the  Fed,  may  swell  during  unusually  heavy  quarterly  tax  payments.  Because  banks  must  pay 
interest  on  T&L  accounts,  they  limit  the  size of T&L  balances  they  are willing  to  accept.  When 
direct  investment  is not  an option,  the  Treasury  can  attempt  to  cancel  previously  scheduled  calls  in 
an attempt  to  draw  down  its balance  in Reserve  banks. 
-12- Fed  provide  the  Treasury  with  “numerous  occasions  to  assist  the  Reserve  authorities  to 
achieve  a desired  objective”  (Auerbach,  1963,  p.  328). 
Unfortunately,  the  Treasury  is unable,  even  with  the  cooperation  of the  Federal  Reserve, 
to  completely  offset  the  effects  of its daily  spending  using  T&L  calls  and  direct  investment. 
Indeed,  as Table  1 shows,  the  Treasury’s  average  monthly  closing  balance  can  differ  substantially 
from  its  $5 billion  target. 
Table  1 
Month  Average  Closing  Balance  ($Millions) 
November  1997  5,015 
December  1997  5,371 
January  1998  6,563 
February  1998  5,118 
March  1998  5,763 
5-month  Average  5,618 
Source:  Daily  Treasury  Statement,  http://fedbbs.access.gpo.gov/dailys.htm 
This,  again,  is the  result  of the  inherent  uncertainty  regarding  the  size/timing  of receipts  and 
expenditures.  That  is, because  the  payments  coming  into/going  out  of the  Treasury’s  account  at 
the  Fed  can  never  be  precisely  known  in advance,  transfers  to/from  T&L  accounts  will  not 
normally  offset  (exactly)  the  shortfall/excess  in these  accounts.  Thus,  as Figure  5 confirms,  one 
expects  a non-zero  change  in the  Treasury’s  daily  closing  balance.  Despite  this,  changes  in the 
daily  closing  balance  do  tend  to  fluctuate  fairly  closely  around  zero,  deviating  most  drastically 
with  quarterly  tax  payments. 
-13- Figure  5 
Change  in Daily Closing  Balance  (Nov.  ‘97 - Mar. ‘98) 
Source:  Daily  Treasury  Statement,  http://fedbbs.access.gpo.gov/dailys.htm 
In  sum,  three  important  points  have  been  made  regarding  the  Treasury’s  operations.  First, 
the  Treasury  recognized  the  disruptive  nature  of its cash  operations  and  responded  by maintaining 
accounts  at private  depositories.  Second,  the  Treasury  uses  these  accounts  to  diminish  the 
reserve  effect  of its operations  by using  T&L  calls  and  direct  investments  to  minimize  the  net 
changes  in Reserve  account  balances  (to  coordinate  the  flow  of its receipts  with  its expenditures). 
Finally,  the  Treasury  and  the  Fed  cooperate  to  bring  about  a fairly  high  degree  of harmony  in 
managing  the  Treasury’s  balances  at Reserve  banks 
4.  SELLING  BONDS  TO  COORDINATE  THE  TREASURY’S  OPERATIONS 
So far we  have  addressed  only  the  Treasury’s  attempts  to  balance  its taxing  and  spending  flows  in 
order  to  minimize  the  reserve  effect  of its operations.  Implicit  in our  discussion,  therefore,  was 
the  notion  that  the  government  attempts  to  balance  its budget.  What  if it doesn’t?  That  is, what 
if the  government  runs  a budget  deficit?  How  does  the  sale of bonds  affect  the  Treasury’s  cash 
flow  operations  and,  subsequently,  the  reserve  effect?  There  are three  scenarios  that  must  be 
-14- analyzed  in order  to  determine  the  reserve  effect  of  selling  bonds,  the  key  being  by whom  and 
how  are they  purchased 
First,  it must  be recognized  that  T&L  accounts  actually  receive  not  only  proceeds  from  tax 
payments,  but  also  funds  from  the  sale of government  debt,  When  commercial  banks  with  T&L 
accounts  (or  customers  of these  banks)  purchase  government  bonds,  there  may  be no  immediate 
loss  of reserves  to  the  purchasing  bank  or the  banking  system,  If, when  the  Treasury  auctions 
new  debt,  it specifies  that  at least  some  portion  of the  bonds  are  eligible  for  purchase  by credit  to 
T&L  accounts,  Special  Depositories  may  acquire  the  bonds  by crediting  deposits  (in the  name  of 
the  U.S.  Treasury).  These  depositories,  therefore,  will not  lose  reserves  as they  purchase  newly- 
issued  bond?.  Similarly,  the  purchase  of newly-issued  government  debt  by a customer  of  a 
Special  Depository,  as long  as the  Treasury  specifies  that  some  (or  all) of the  offering  is eligible 
for  purchase  by T&L  credit,  will leave  reserves  unaffected.  For  example,  when  a customer  of a 
Special  Depository  purchases  government  securities,  the  Treasury  redeposits  the  check  into  the 
bank  on  which  the  check  was  drawn.  The  bank  then  credits  the  Treasury’s  T&L  account, 
offsetting  the  debit  to  the  buyer’s  account.  Thus,  like the  purchase  of government  debt  by a 
Special  Depository,  the  sale  of government  debt  to  a customer  of one  of these  institutions  can  be 
effected  without  any loss  of reserves. 
The  second  method  concerns  the  private  purchase  of newly-issued  government  debt  that 
does  not  involve  crediting  a T&L  account.  When  the  securities  are  ineligible  for  purchase  by 
T&L  credit,  and/or  are not  purchased  by a so-called  “note-option”  bank  (or  one  of its customers), 
the  purchase  of government  bonds  will immediately  drain  reserves  from  both  the  bank  and  the 
I4 The  reader  might  wonder  whether  additional  reserves  are  required  as a result  of the  larger  T&L 
balance.  The  answer  is no.  Since  the  establishment  of interest-bearing  note  accounts  in November 
1978,  Special  Depositories  have  been  free  of reserve  requirements  against  T&L  deposits. 
-15 banking  system.  This  is because  the  proceeds  from  the  sale of the  securities  will not  stay  “in the 
system”  but  will be  deposited  directly  into  one  of the  Treasury’s  accounts  at a Federal  Reserve 
bank.  When  bonds  are  sold  in this  way,  member  bank  reserves  decline  as the  Federal  Reserve 
credits  the  Treasury’s  account,  increasing  the  RHB  in Figure  1.  Thus,  a bank  wishing  to  purchase 
U.S.  government  securities,  when  T&L  credit  is not  an option,  will do  so by drawing  on  its 
account  at the  Federal  Reserve.  A system-wide  loss  of reserves  will,  therefore,  accompany  every 
private  purchase  of newly-issued  government  debt  not  eligible  for  payment  through  T&L  credit. 
Finally,  the  sale of Treasury  securities  to  the  Federal  Reserve  must  be considered.  If the 
Fed  purchases  newly-issued  bonds  directly  from  the  Treasury,  it will not  cause  a change  in 
member  bank  reserves.  This,  as Figure  1 makes  clear,  is because  both  the  RHB  (U.S.  Treasury 
Balance  at Fed  ) and  the  LHB  (U.S.  Government  Securities  ) increase  by the  same  amount, 
leaving  total  reserves  unaffected.  Furthermore,  since  the  government’s  balance  sheet  can be 
considered  on  a consolihted  basis,  given  by the  sum  of the  Treasury’s  and  Federal  Reserve’s 
balance  sheets  with  offsetting  assets  and  liabilities  simply  canceling  one  another  out  (Tobin, 
1998)  the  sale  of bonds  by the  Treasury  to  the  Fed  is simply  an internal  accounting  operation, 
providing  the  government  with  a self-constructed  spendable  balance.  Although  self-imposed 
constraints  may  prevent  the  Treasury  from  creating  all  of its deposits  in this  way,  there  is no  real 
limit  on  its ability  to  do  so15, 
Now,  the  Treasury  clearly  has choices  regarding  the  manner  in which  newly-issued  bonds 
will be  sold.  For  example,  if the  government  p1au.s to  engage  in deficit  spending,  the  Treasury  can 
sell bonds,  allow  them  to  be purchased  by T&L  credit,  and  thereby  eliminate  any  immediate 
l5 The  Federal  Reserve  was,  for  a time,  prohibited  from  purchasing  bonds  directly  from  the 
Treasury.  This  changed  during  WWII,  when  the  Fed  was  authorized  to  purchase  up  to  $5 billion 
of  securities  directly  from  the  Treasury  Since  then,  the  limit  has  been  raised  several  times. 
-16- impact  on  reserve?.  When  the  Treasury  sells bonds  in this  way,  the  bonds  act  as a sort  of 
ex ante  coordination  tool.  Since  the  Treasury  can  control  the  size  and  timing  of hmds  transferred 
from  T&L  accounts,  this  type  of bond  sale helps  the  Treasury  to  drain  (more-or-less)  the  same 
number  of reserves  from  the  system  that  are being  added  to  the  system  as a result  of its deficit 
spending17. 
If, however,  there  is a problem  with  the  coordination  (for  example  if the  Treasury  and  Fed 
underestimate  the  amount  of checks  that  are drawn  on the  Treasury’s  account  at the 
Fed),  bonds  could  be  sold  in order  to  drain  exce.s.s reserves.  In other  words,  insufficient  T&L  calls 
(which  result  in a system-wide  increase  in reserves  and  threaten  to  send  the  overnight  lending  rate 
to  a zero  percent  bid)  could  prompt  the  sale of bonds  as an expost  coordination  tool.  In  order  to 
immediately  drain  the  excess  reserves,  banks  could  not  be  allowed  to  purchase  the  bonds  by 
crediting  a T&L  account,  but  this  is something  the  Treasury  can  specify  (or  something  the  Fed 
can  do). 
5.  THE  NUANCES  OF RESERVE  ACCOUNTING 
The  purpose  of this  section  is twofold.  First,  the  commonly-held  belief  that  taxes  and  bonds  are 
used  to  finance  government  spending  will be examined.  First,  the  question  will be  addressed 
intuitively,  drawing  on  the  reserve  effects  analyzed  in Sections  2-4.  Second,  for  those  who 
remain  unconvinced  by the  intuitive  analysis,  the  question  as to  whether  the  proceeds  from  taxes 
and  bond  sales  are  even  capable  of  financing  government  spending  will be considered.  The 
I6 Boulding  notes  that  deficit  spending  most  commonly  involves  this  practice  (1966). 
17Note  that  the  government  can  deficit  spend  without  taxing  or  selling  bonds  first  but  that  if 
government  spending  is greater  than  taxation,  the  banking  system  will be  left with  excess  reserves. 
The  Treasury,  therefore,  prefers  to  use  bonds  to  coordinate  its deficit  spending,  selling  them  to 
Special  Depositories  (and  allowing  T&L  credit)  before  spending  from  its accounts  at Reserve 
banks.  The  bonds,  then,  allow  the  government  to  defend  (ex ante)  the  fed  funds  rate. 
-17- argument  requires  an application  of basic  accounting  principles  to  an analysis  of reserve 
accounting  in order  to  determine  whether  revenues  from  taxation  and  the  sale of bonds  are  even 
capable  of financing  government  spending. 
Both  questions  seems  absurd.  There  is surely  no  doubt  that  the  proceeds  from  taxation 
and  bond  sales  are  deposited  into  accounts  held  by the  U.S.  Treasury  (either  with  commercial 
banks  or  at the  Federal  Reserve)  and  that  the  government  spends  by writing  checks  on  Treasury 
accounts  at Reserve  banks.  Moreover,  since  funds  are transferred  from  T&L  accounts  to  the 
Treasury’s  account  at the  Fed  in order  to  cover  anticipated  shortfalls  in these  accounts,  it certainly 
looks  as though  the  government  uses  these  proceeds  to  finance  its  spending.  This  apparent 
interdependence  is, undoubtedly,  the  basis  for  the  treatment  of taxation  and  bond  sales  as 
financing  operations.  But  is the  coordination  of taxation  and  bond  sales  with  (deficit)  spending 
due  to  necessity  or  does  it mask  a more  pragmatic  operation? 
Let  us  consider  the  argument  that  the  coordination  owes  itself  to  necessity;  that  is, that  the 
government  needs  to  tax  or borrow  from  the  private  sector  in order  to  finance  its spending.  The 
question  can  be approached  pragmatically,  using  the  following  important  conclusions  drawn  in 
Sections  2-4: 
1.  The  payment  of taxes  and  the  purchase  of bonds  by the private  sector  drain  reserves  from  the 
banking  system  as the  proceeds  are placed  into  the  Treasury’s  account  at the  Federal  Reserve. 
2.  Government  spending  causes  a system-wide  increase  in aggregate  bank  reserves. 
3.  Changes  in the  total  level  of bank  reserves  cause  changes  in the  federal  funds  and  other  short- 
term  interest  rates. 
-18- 4.  The  Treasury  manages  its closing  balance  in Reserve  accounts  by coordinating  its  spending, 
taxing  and  bond  sales. 
5.  Barring  self-imposed  constraints,  the  Treasury  could  manufacture  all of its  spending  balances 
by selling  bonds  directly  to  the  Federal  Reserve. 
But  why  should  the  government  need  to  take  from  the  private  sector  the  money  (currency  and/or 
bank  reserves)  that  it alone  is capable  of creating?  It  seems  reasonable  to  suggest  that  it is not 
money  but  bridges,  armies,  satellites,  etc.  that  the  government  wants  and  that  it acquires  them  by 
encouraging  the  population  to  provide  them  in exchange  for  government  money.  That  is, it 
cannot  be the  government  but  the  public/citizens  who  need  the  money  in order  to  settle  their  tax 
liabilities  to  the  state. 
Indeed,  the  entire  process  of taxing  and  spending  must,  as a matter  of logic,  have  begun 
with  the  government  first  creating  (and  spending)  new  government  money.  How,  after  all, could 
a population  settle  its tax  liabilities  using  the  government’s  money  (I-PM)  before the  government 
had  made  its money  available?  In other  words,  the  government’s  purchase  of goods  and  services 
using  newly-created  money  mustfirst  have  supplied  the  citizens  with  the  means  with  which  to  pay 
taxes.  Thus,  taxes  can be  conceived  as the  means  by which  the  government  directs  real  resources 
from  private  to  public  domain.  If this  theory  is accepted,  taxes  are used  to  create  a demand  for 
the  government’s  money,  not  to  “finance”  the  government’s  spending. 
Similarly,  bonds  need  not  be issued  in order  to  allow  the  government  to  spend  in excess  of 
current  taxation.  This,  again,  is because  the  government  can  always  create  its own  spendable 
balance  internally  (on  its consolidated  balance  sheet)  by offsetting  a Treasury  liability  against  a 
-19- Federal  Reserve  asset  (e.g.,  but  not  necessarily,  a Treasury  bond).  In the  absence  of bond  sales, 
deficit  spending  would  result  in a net  increase  in aggregate  bank  reserves.  Bonds,  then,  are used 
to  coordinate  deficit  spending,  draining  what  would  otherwise become  excess  reserves.  They 
provide  the  private  sector  with  an interest-earning  alternative  to  non-interest-bearing  government 
currency  and  allow  the  government  to  spend  in excess  of taxation  while  maintaining  positive 
overnight  lending  rates. 
Thus,  an intuitive  analysis  of Treasury  operations  suggests  a practical  motivation  for  the 
coordination  of taxation  and  bond  sales  with  government  spending.  Specifically,  because  of the 
reserve  effects  of taxing,  spending,  and  selling  bonds,  the  government  chooses  to  coordinate  these 
operations  in order  to  mitigate  the  impact  on  banks’  reserve  positions  and,  hence,  on  short-term 
interest  rates.  This  interdependence,  then,  is not  de,facto evidence  of a “financing”  role  for  taxes 
and  bonds.  On the  contrary,  taxes  can be viewed  as a means  of creating  a demand  for  the 
government’s  money,  HPM.  Bonds,  which  are used  to  prevent  deficit  spending  from  flooding  the 
system  with  excess  reserves,  allow  the  maintenance  of positive  overnight  lending  rates.  Neither 
taxes  nor  bond  sales,  therefore,  need  be viewed  as a financing  operation. 
Many  readers  will undoubtedly  remain  unconvinced,  based  on  the  intuitive  analysis  just 
presented,  that  the  treatment  of taxation  and  bond  sales  as financing  operations  should  be 
discontinued.  Fortunately,  there  is another,  more  powerful,  method  by which  to  argue  that 
taxation  and  bond  sales  should  not  be considered  financing  operations,  The  argument  is a 
technical  one  and  requires  an understanding  that  Federal  Reserve  notes  (and  reserves)  are booked 
as liabilities  on  the  Fed’s  balance  sheet  and  that  these  liabilities  are  extinguished/discharged  when 
they  are  offered  in payment  to  the  State.  It must  also  be recognized  that  when  currency  or 
-2o- reserves  return  to  the  State,  the  liabilities  of the  State  are reduced  and  high-powered  money  is 
destroyed. 
The  destruction  of these  promises  is no  different  from  the  private  destruction  of  a promise 
once  it has been  fulfilled.  In  other  words,  when  an individual  takes  out  a loan,  she issues  a 
promise  to  a bank.  Once  she  ‘makes  good’  on  that  promise  (i.e.  repays  the  loan),  she  may 
‘destroy’  that  loan  debt  (liability)  by eliminating  it from  her  balance  sheet.  Likewise,  the  State, 
once  it fulfills  its promise  to  accept  its own  money  (HPM)  at  State  pay-offices,  can  eliminate  an 
equivalent  number  of these  liabilities  from  its balance  sheet. 
Thus,  while  bank  money  (Ml)  is destroyed  when  demand  deposits  are used  to  pay  taxes, 
the  government’s  money,  HPM,  is destroyed  as the  funds  are  placed  into  the  Treasury’s  account 
at the  Fed.  Viewed  this  way,  it can  be  convincingly  argued  that  the  money  collected  from  taxation 
and  bond  sales  cannot  possibly  finance  the  government’s  spending.  This  is because  in order  to 
‘get  its hands  on’  the  proceeds  from  taxation  and  bond  sales,  the  government  must  destroy  the 
money  it has  collected.  Clearly,  government  spending  cannot  be financed  by money  that  is 
destroyed  when  received  in payment  to  the  State! 
How,  if not  by using  the  money  received  in payment  of taxes  and  bond  sales,  does  the 
government  finance  its  spending?  Notice  that  the  government  writes  checks  on  an account  that 
does  not  comprise  part  of the  money  supply  or HPM  but  that  as  it does,  the  funds  become  part  of 
the  money  supply  (Ml  if deposited  into  checking  accounts,  M2  if savings  accounts,  etc.)  and  part 
of HPM.  It is therefore  apparent  that  while  the  payment  of taxes  destroys  an equivalent  amount 
of money  (Ml  immediately  and  HPM  as the  proceeds  go  into  the  Treasury’s  account  at the  Fed), 
spending  from  this  account  creates  an equivalent  amount  of new  money  - both  bank  money  and 
-21- HPM.  Modern  governments,  then,  finance  all of their  spending  through  the  direct  creation  of new 
(high-powered)  money. 
6.  SUMMARY  AND  CONCLUSIONS 
If the  government  (Fed  and  Treasury)  had  no  regard  for  the  “reserve  effect”  of its operations,  it 
would  have  little  use  for  T&L  accounts.  It could  simply  create  its own  spendable  deposit  (on  its 
consolidated  balance  sheet)  and  then  spend  (adding  reserves  and  creating  money)  without  regard 
for  the  size/timing  of its tax  receipts.  But  this  behavior  would  frequently  leave  a banking  system 
which  was  previously  satisfied  with  its reserve  position  with  substantially  more  excess  reserves 
than  it wished  to  maintain,  A system  flush  with  excess  reserves  would  find  few  bidders  for  these 
funds,  and  the  overnight  lending  rate  would  fall toward  zero.  Taxes,  as they  drifted  in, would 
drain  a portion  of the  excess  reserves.  Still, the  funds  rate  could  remain  at a zero  percent  bid  for  a 
prolonged  period  of time. 
In  order  to  move  to  a positive  funds  rate,  either  the  Federal  Reserve  or the  Treasury 
would  be forced  to  sell bonds  to  drain  excess  reserves18.  Banks,  not  wishing  to  hold  an excessive 
amount  of non-interest-bearing  government  money,  would  be  all-too-happy  to  exchange  non- 
interest-earning  reserves  for  interest-bearing  Treasury  bonds.  The  bonds  would  have  to  be  sold 
until  enough  excess  reserves  had  been  drained  to  yield  a positive  (target)  mnds  rate.  Although 
this  process  of  adding  and  later draining  reserves  could  work,  it would  involve  substantial 
variation  in the  level  of reserves  and,  subsequently,  significant  turmoil  in the  market  for  federal 
l8 Note  that  bonds  would  have  to  be  sold  even  if the  government  ran  an annually  balanced 
budget.  This  is because  it is impossible  to  eliminate  the  “reserve  effects”  of the  Treasury’s  daily 
operations.  Thus,  swings  in the  Treasury’s  daily  closing  balance,  which  threaten  to  move  the 
fi.mds rate  away  from  its target,  would  induce  the  sale of bonds  despite  an annually  balanced 
budget. 
-22- funds  Knowing  that  these  are the  undesirable  effects  of disregarding  the  reserve  effects  of its 
operations,  the  Treasury  chooses  to  coordinate  its operations,  transferring  funds  from  T&L 
accounts  (draining  reserves)  as it spends  from  its account  at the  Fed. 
Taxes  are  not  necessary  for,  or  even  capable  of,  financing  government  spending  when  they 
are paid  using  high-powered  money  (i.e.  by cash  or  check  in a fiat  money  system).  In order  for 
the  government  to  ‘get  its hands  on’  the  proceeds  from  taxation,  it must  place  these  funds  into  the 
Treasury’s  account  at the  Fed.  As it does,  the  banking  system  loses  an equivalent  amount  of 
desired  and/or  required  reserves  (either  immediately  or as the  Treasury  transfers  the  proceeds 
from  T&L  accounts  into  its accounts  at Reserve  banks),  and  an equivalent  amount  of HPM  is 
destroyed.  Similarly,  reserves  are  drained  and  HPM  is destroyed  when  the  Treasury  issues  bonds 
(immediately  if T&L  credit  is not  allowed  or with  a lag as the  proceeds  are transferred  from  T&L 
accounts).  In contrast,  government  spending  from  the  Treasury’s  account  at the  Fed  injects 
reserves  and  creates  an equivalent  amount  of new  money  (Ml,  M2,  etc.  and  HPM). 
It is impossible  to  perfectly  balance  (in timing  and  amount)  the  government’s  receipts  with 
its expenditures.  The  best  the  Treasury  and  the  Fed  can  do  is to  compare  estimates  of anticipated 
changes  in the  Treasury’s  account  at the  Fed  and  to  transfer  approximately  the  correct  amount 
to/from  T&L  accounts.  Errors  due  to  excessive  or insufficient  T&L  “calls”  are the  norm. 
Although  “same-day  calls”  and  “direct  investments”  are  designed  to  permit  the  authorities  to  react 
to  these  errors,  they  are  not  always  an option. 
When  the  Treasury  is unable  to  correct  these  errors  on  its own,  the  Federal  Reserve  may 
have  to  offset  changes  in the  Treasury’s  closing  balance.  This  will be necessary  whenever  the 
errors  are  large  enough  to  move  the  funds  rate  away  from  its target  rate.  In fact,  as argued 
-23- previously,  the  Treasury’s  balance  at the  Fed  is “often  the  biggest  source  of uncertainty”  faced  by 
monetary  policy-makers  (Meulendyke,  1989,  p. 159).  Its  role  as an offsetting  agency  is essentially 
forced  upon  it by its commitment  to  a target  funds  rate.  Indeed,  Poole  (1975)  goes  further, 
stating  that  the  Fed  will usually  abandon  any  other  objective  target  in order  to  maintain  the  funds 
rate  within  its tolerance  range.  The  adding/draining  of reserves,  then,  is largely  non-discretionary, 
as monetary  policy  is concerned  primarily  with  maintaining  the  overnight  lending  rate.  Fiscal 
policy,  in contrast,  has to  do  with  determining  the  supply  of high-powered  money.  Moreover, 
while  both  taxation  and  bond  sales  drain  reserves  from  the  banking  system,  neither  provide  the 
government  with  money  with  which  to  finance  its spending.  Indeed,  both  taxation  and  bond  sales 
lead  (ultimately)  to  the  destruction  of HPM. 
An  analysis  of reserve  accounting  reveals  that  all government  spending  is financed  by the 
direct  creation  of HPM;  bond  sales  and  taxation  are  merely  alternative  means  by which  to  drain 
reserves/destroy  HPM.  The  choice,  then,  is between  alternative  methods  for  draining  reserves  in 
order  to  prevent  the  overnight  lending  rate  from  falling  to  zero.  In light  of these  findings,  it is, 
perhaps,  time  to  reconsider  our  definitions  of monetary  and  fiscal  policy  as well  as our  treatment 
of taxation  and  bond  sales  as “financing”  operations. 
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